© www.talawas.org     |     về trang chính
(dùng Unicode hoặc không dấu)
tác giả:
Tủ sách talawas
Joseph E. Stiglitz
Chủ nghĩa xã hội đi về đâu?
16 kỳ
Nguyễn Quang A dịch
 1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9   10   11   12   13   14   15   16 
Tài liệu tham khảo

Akerlof, G. 1970. The market for "Lemons": Qualitative uncertainty and the market mechanism. Quarterly Journal of Economics 86:488-500.

Akerlof, G. 1991. Procrastination and obedience. American Economic Review 81:1-19.

Alchian, A. 1950. Uncertainty, evolution and economic theory. Journal of Political Economy 58:211-221.

Amsden. A. H. 1989. Asia's Next Giant: South Korea and Late Industrialization. Oxford University Press, Oxford.

Amott, R., B. C. Greenwald, and J. E. Stiglitz. 1992. Information and economic efficiency. Paper presented at AEA annual meeting in New Orleans.

Amott, R., and J. E. Stiglitz. 1985. Labor turnover, wage structure and moral hazard: The inefficiency of competitive markets. Journal of Labor Economics 3:434-462.

Amott, R., and J. E. Stiglitz. 1986. Moral hazard and optimal commodity taxation. Journal of Public Economics 23:1-24.

Amott, .R., and J. E. Stiglitz. 1988a. The basic analytics of moral hazard. Scandinavian Journal of Economics 90:383-413.

Amott, R., and J. E. Stiglitz. 1988b. Randomization with asymmetric information. Rand Journal of Economics 19:344-362.

Arnott, R., and J. E. Stiglitz. 1989. The welfare economics of moral hazard. In Risk, Information and Insurance: Essays in the Memory of Karl H. Borch, Henri Louberge (ed.). Kluwer Academic Publishers, Norwell, MA, pp. 91-122.

Arnott, R., and J. E. Stiglitz. 1990a. Price equilibrium, efficiency, and decentralizability in insurance markets. Working Paper, Stanford University.

Arnott, R., and J. E. Stiglitz. 1990b. Equilibrium in competitive insurance markets with moral hazard. Working Paper, Stanford University.

Arnott, R., and J. E. Stiglitz. 1991. Moral hazard and non-market Institutions: Dysfunctional crowding out or peer monitoring. American Economic Review 81:179-190.

Arrow, K.J. 1951a. Social Choice and Individual Values. Wiley, New York.

Arrow. K. J. 1951b. An extension of the basic theorem of classical welfare economics. In Proceedings of the Second Berkeley Symposium on Mathematical Studies and Probability, J. Neyman (ed.). University of California Press, Berkeley. pp. 507-532.

Arrow, K. J. 1962a. The economic implications of learning by doing. Review of Economic Studies 29:155-173.

Arrow, K. J. 1962b. Economic welfare and the allocation of resources for invention. In The Rate and Direction of Inventive Activity. Princeton University Press, Princeton, pp. 609-625.

Arrow, K. J. 1974. The Limits of Organization. Norton. New York.

Arrow, K. J. 1988. Toward a theory of price adjustment. In The Allocation of Economic Resources, P. A. Baran, T. Scitovsky, and E. S. Shaw (eds.). Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Arrow, K.J., and G. Debreu. 1954. Existence of an equilibrium for a competitive economy. Econometrica 22:265-290.

Asquith, P., and D. W. Mullins. 1986a. Equity issues and stock price dilution. Journal of Financial Economics 13:296-320.

Asquith, P., and D. W. Mullins. 1986b. Equity issues and offering dilution. Journal of Financial Economics 15:61-89.

Bain, J. S. 1956. Barriers to New Competition. Harvard University Press, Cambridge.

Bardhan, P. (ed.). 1989. The Economic Theory of Agrarian Institutions. Clarendon Press, Oxford.

Barzel. Y. 1968. Optimal timing of innovations. Review of Economic Studies 35:348-355.

Bator, F. 1958. The anatomy of market failures. Quarterly Journal of Economics 72:351-379.

Baumol. W. J. 1959. Business Behavior, Value and Growth. Harcourt Brace, New York.

Baumol. W. J. 1982. Contestable markets: An uprising in the theory of industry structure. American Economic Review 72:1-15.

Baumol, W. J., J. C. Panzar, and R. D. Willig. 1982. Contestable Markets and the Theory of Industry Structure. Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, San Diego.

Becker, G., and G. Stigler. 1974. Law enforcement, malfeasance, and compensation of enforcers. Journal of Legal Studies 3:1-18.

Berle, A. 1926a. Managemenf power and stockholders' property. Harvard Business Review 5:424-432.

Berle, A., Jr. 1926b. Non-voting stock and "bankers" control. Harvard Law Review.

Berle, A., and G. Means. 1932. The Modern Corporation and Private Property. Commerce Clearing House, New York.

Bhagwati, J. 1987. The generalized theory of distortions and welfare. In International Trade, J. Bhagwati (ed.). Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp. 265-286.

Blinder, A. S. 1987. Hard Heads, Soft Hearts: Tough-Minded Economics for a Just Society. Addison-Wesley, Reading, MA.

Braverman, A., and J. E. Stiglitz. 1982. Sharecropping and the interlinking of agrarian markets. American Economic Review 72:695-715.

Braverman. A.. and J. E. Stiglitz. 1986. Cost sharing arrangement under sharecropping: Moral hazard, incentive flexibility and risk. Journal of Agricultural Economics 68:642-652.

Bray, M., and D. M. Kreps. 1987. Rational learning and rational expectations. In Arrow and the Ascent of Modern Economic Theory. New York University Press. New York. pp. 597-625.

Brito, D., J. Hamilton, S. Slutsky, and J. Stiglitz. 1990. Pareto-efficient tax structures. Oxford Economic Papers 42:61-77.

Buchanan, J. 1986. Liberty, Market and State, Political Economics in the 1980s. New York University Press, New York.

Burroughs, B., and J. Helyar. 1990. Barbarians at the Gate. Harper and Row, New York.

Calvo, G., and J. Frankel. 1991. Credit markets, credibility, and economic transformation. Journal of Economic Perspectives 5: 139-148.

Caves, D. W., and L. R. Christensen. 1980. The relative efficiency of public and private firms in a competitive environment: The case of Canadian railroads. Journal of Political Economy 88:958-976.

Chamberlin, E. 1933. The Theory of Monopolistic Competition. Harvard University Press, Cambridge.

Cheung, S. 1963. The Theory of Share Tenancy. Chicago University Press, Chicago.

Clark, J. B. 1923. Studies in the Economies of Overhead Costs. Chicago University Press, Chicago.

Coase, R. 1937. The nature of the firm. Economica: 386-405.

Coase, R. 1960. On the problem of social cost. Journal of Law and Economics 3: 1-44.

Dasgupta, P. 1993. An Inquiry into Well-being and Destination. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Dasgupta, P., and J. E. Stiglitz. 1972. On optimal taxation and public production. Review of Economic Studies 39:87-103.

Dasgupta, P., and J. E. Stiglitz. 1977. Tariffs vs. quotas as revenue raising devices under uncertainty. American Economic Review 67:975-981.

Dasgupta, P., and J. E. Stiglitz. 1980a. Uncertainty, market structure and the speed of R&D. Bell Journal of Economics 11: 1- 28.

Dasgupta, p ., and J. E. Stiglitz. 1980b. Industrial structure and the nature of innovative activity. Economic Journal 90:266-293.

Dasgupta, P., and J. E. Stiglitz. 1988a. Potential competition, actual competition and eco- nomic welfare. European Economic Review 32:569-577.

Dasgupta, P., and J. E. Stiglitz. 1988b. Learning by doing, market structure and industrial and trade policies. Oxford Economic Papers 40:246- 268.

Dasgupta, P., R. Gilbert, and J. E. Stiglitz. 1983. Strategic considerations in invention and innovation: The case of natural resources. Econometrica 512:1439-1448.

Debreu, G. 1951. The coefficient of resource utilization. Econometrica 19:273-292.

Debreu, G. 1959. The Theory of Value. Wiley, New York.

Demsetz, M. 1968. Why regulate utilities? Journal of Law and Economics 11:55-66.

Diamond, P. 1967. The role of the stock market in a general equilibrium model with technological uncertainty. American Economic Review 57:759-776.

Diamond, P. 1971. A model of price adjustment. Journal of Economic Theory 3:156-168.

Dixit, A. 1980. The role of investment in entry-deterrence. Economic Journal 90:95- 106.

Dixit, A. 1992. Investment and hysteresis. Journal of Economic Perspectives 6:107- 132.

Dixit, A., and J. E. Stiglitz. 1977. Monopolistic competition and optimal product diversity. American Economic Review 67:297-308.

Domar, E., and R. Musgrave. 1944. Proportional income taxation and risk taking. Quarterly Journal of Economics 58:388-422.

Dosi, G., C. Freeman, R. Nelson, G. Silverberg, and L. Soete. 1988. Technological Change and Economic Theory. Pinter, London.

Drèze, J. 1974. Investment under private ownership: Optimality, equilibrium and stability. In Allocation under Uncertainty: Equilibrium and Optimality, J. Drèze (ed.). Macmillan, New York, pp. 261-297.

Drèze, J. 1987. Essays on Economic Decisions under Uncertainty. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

Drèze, and A. K. Sen. 1989. Hunger and Public Action. Oxford University Press, Oxford.

Eaton, J. 1986. Lending with costly enforcement of repayment and potential fraud. Journal of Banking and Finance 10:281-293.

Eaton, J., and M. Gersowitz. 1981. Debt with potential repudiation: Theoretical and empirical analysis. Review of Economic Studies 48:289-309.

Edlin, A., and J. E. Stiglitz. 1992. Discouraging rivals: Managerial rent seeking and economic inefficiencies. Presented at CEPR Conference on Corporate Governance, Stanford University, May 1992.

Fama, E. 1980. Banking in the theory of finance. Journal of Monetary Economics 6:39-57.

Fang, X. 1993. Essays on the processes of economic transitions. Ph.D. dissertation. Stanford University.

Farrell, M. J. 1970. Some elementary selection processes in economics. Review of Economic Studies 37:305-319.

Farrell, M. J. 1987. Information and the Coase theorem. Journal of Economic Perspectives 1:113-129

Farrell, M. J. 1988. Puzzles: Sylvia, ice cream and more. Journal of Economic Perspectives 2:175-182.

Foley, D. K. 1970. Economic equilibrium. with costly marketing. Journal of Economic Theory 2:280- 284.

Gale, I., and J. E. Stiglitz. 1985. Futures markets are almost always informationally inefficient. Princeton University Financial Research Center Memorandum No.57. February.

Gilbert, R. J., and D. M. G. Newbery. 1982. Preemptive patenting and the persistence of monopoly. American Economic Review 72:514-526.

Green, J. and N. Stokey. 1983. A comparison of tournaments and contracts. Journal of Political Economy 91:349-364.

Greenwald, B. C. 1986. Adverse selection in the labor market. Review of Economic Studies 53:325-347.

Greenwald, B., and J. E. Stiglitz. 1984. Informational imperfections in capital markets and macro-economic fluctuations. American Economic Review 74: 1- 94-199.

Greenwald, B., and J. E. Stiglitz. 1986. Externalities in economies with imperfect information and incomplete markets. Quarterly Journal of Economics 101:229-264.

Greenwald, B., and J. E. Stiglitz. 1987. Keynesian, new Keynesian and neoclassical economics. Oxford Economic Papers 39:119-133.

Greenwald, B., and J. E. Stiglitz. 1988. Pareto inefficiency of market economies: Search and efficiency wage models. American Economic Association Papers and Proceedings 78:351-355.

Greenwald, B., and J. E. Stiglitz. 1990a. Macroeconomic models with equity and credit rationing. In Information, Capital Markets and Investments, R. Glenn Hubbard (ed.). Chicago University Press, Chicago.

Greenwald, B., and J. E. Stiglitz. 1990b. Asymmetric information and the new theory of the firm. Financial constraints and risk behavior. American Economic Review 80:160- 165.

Greenwald, B., and J. E. Stiglitz. 1992. Information, finance and markets: The architecture of allocative mechanisms. Journal of Industrial and Corporate Change 1:37-63.

Greenwald, B., and J. E. Stiglitz. 1993. Financial market imperfections and business cycles. Quarterly Journal of Economics 108: 77- I 14.

Greenwald, B., J. E. Stiglitz, and A. Weiss. 1984. Informational imperfections in the capital markets and macro-economic fluctuations. American Economic Review 74: 194-199 .

Grossman, S. J. 1975. The existence of future markets, noisy rational expectations and informational externalities. Ph.D. dissertation. University of Chicago.

Grossman, S. J. 1976. On the efficiency of competitive stock markets where traders have diverse information. Journal of Finance 31:573-585.

Grossman, S. J. 198la. The informational role of warranties and private disclosure about product quality. Journal of Law and Economics 24:46 l -484.

Grossman, S. J. 1981b. Nash equilibrium and the industrial organization of markets with large fixed costs. Economica 49: l 149- l 172.

Grossman, S. J., and O. Hart. 1980. Takeover bids, the free rider problem and the theory of the corporation. Bell Journal of Economics 11:42-64.

Grossman, S. J., and O. Hart. 1986. The costs and benefits of ownership: A theory of vertical and lateral integration. Journal of Political Economy 94:691 -718.

Grossman, S. J., and O. D. Hart. 1988. One share-one vote and the market for corporate control. Journal of Financial Economics 20: 175 -202.

Grossman, S. J., and J. E. Stiglitz. 1976. Infonnation and competitive price systems. American Economic Review 66:246-253.

Grossman, S. J., and J. E. Stiglitz. 1977. On value maximization and alternative objectives of the firm. Journal of Finance 32:389-402.

Grossman, S. J., and J. E. Stiglitz. 1980a. On the impossibility of informationally efficient markets. American Economic Review 70:393-408.

Grossman, S. J., and J. E. Stiglitz. 1980b. Stockholder unanimity in the making of production and financial decisions. Quarterly Journal of Economics 94:543-566.

Grossman, S. J., and J. E. Stiglitz. 1986. Information and competitive price systems. American Economic Review 66:246-253.

Hahn, F. 1966. Equilibrium dynamics with heterogeneous capital goods. Quarterly Journal of Economics 80:133- 146.

Hahn, F. 1971. Equilibrium with transaction costs. Econometrica 39:417-400.

Hahn, R. W. 1989. Economic prescriptions for environmental problems: How the patient followed the doctor's orders. Journal of Economic Perspectives 3:98-114.

Hall, R. E. 1988. The relation between price and marginal cost in U.S. industry. Journal of Political Economy 96:921-947.

Hannan, M. T., and J. Freeman. 1977. The population ecology of organizations. American Journal of Sociology 82:929-964.

Hannaway, J. 1989. Managing Managers: The Working of an Administrative System. Oxford University Press, Oxford.

Hannaway, J. 1992. Higher order skills, job design, and incentives: An analysis and proposal. American Educational Research ]ournaI 29:3-21.

Hannaway, J. 1993a, Decentralization in two school distributions: Challenging the standard paradigm. In Decentralization and Education: Can We Fulfill the Promise? J.

Hannaway and M, Carnoy (eds.), Josey-Bass, San Francisco.

Hannaway, J. 1993b. Political pressure and decentralization in institutional organization: The case of school districts. Sociology of Education 66:147-163.

Hannaway, J., and Carnoy, M. 1993, Decentralization and Education: Can We Fulfill the Promise? Josey-Bass, San Francisco.

Hanusch, H. 1988. Evolutionary Economics. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

Harberger, A. C. 1954. Monopoly and resource allocation. AEA Papers and Proceedings 44:77-87.

Harris. C., and J. Vickers. 1987. Racing with uncertainty. Review of Economic Studies 54:1-21.

Hart, O. 1975. On the optimality of equilibrium when the market structure is incomplete. Journal of Economic Theory 11:4 18-443.

Hart, O., and B. Holmstrom. 1987. The theory of contracts. In Advances in Economic Theory, T. Bewley (ed.). Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp. 71-155.

Hayek, F. A. 1989. The Fatal Conceit. University of Chicago Press, Chicago.

Heilbroner, D. 1991. Reflections: Economic predictions. New Yorker, July 8.

Hellwig, M. 1977. A model of borrowing and lending with bankruptcy. Econometrica 45 1876-1906.

Hirschman. A. O. 1970. Exit, Voice, and Loyalty. Harvard University Press, Cambridge.

Hirshleifer, J. 1971. The private and social value of information and the reward to incentive activity. American Economic Review 61:561-574.

Hirshleifer, J. 1977. Economics from a biological viewpoint. Journal of Law and Economics 20:1 -52.

Hirshleifer, J., and J. Riley. 1979. The analytics of uncertainty and information: An expository survey. Journal of Economic Literature 17:1375-1421.

Hoff, K., A. Braverman, and J. E. Stiglitz. 1993. The Theory of Rural Economic Organizations. Oxford University Press, Oxford.

Holmstrom, B. 1982. Moral hazard in teams. Bell Journal of Economics 13:324-340.

Holmstrom, B., and P. Milgrom. 1987. Aggregation and linearity in the provision of intertemporal incentives. Econometrica 55:303-328.

Holmstrom, B., and P. Milgrom. 1991. Multitask principal-agent analyses: Incentive conracts, asset ownership, and job design. Journal of Law, Economics and Organization 7 (special issue): 24-52.

Jarrell, G. A., J. A. Brickley, and J. M. Netter. 1988. The market for corporate control: The empirical evidence since 1980. Journal of Economic Perspectives 2:49-68.

Jensen, M. 1986. Agency costs of free cash flow, corporate finance and takeovers. American Economic Review 76:323-329.

Jensen. M., and W. Meckling. 1976. Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics 3:305-360.

Jensen, M., and K. Murphy. 1990. Performance pay and top management incentives. Journal of Political Economy 98:225-264.

Jordan, J. 1977. Expectations equilibrium and informational efficiency for stochastic environments. Journal of Economic Theory 16:354-372.

Jordan, J. S. 1983. On the efficient markets hypothesis. Econametrica 51:1325-1343.

Keynes, J. M. 1936. The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money. Macnillan, London.

Klein, B., and K. B. Leffler. 1981. The role of market forces in assuring contractual performance. Journal of Political Economy 89:615-641.

Knight, F. 1921. Risk, Uncertainty and Profit. Houghton Mifflin, Boston, 1921.

Kornai, J. 1980. Economics of Shortage. North Holland, Amsterdam.

Kornai, J. 1986. The soft budget constraint. Kyklos 39(1):3-30.

Kornai, J. 1990. The affinity between ownership forms and coordination mechanisms: The common experience of reforms in socialist countries. Journal of Economic Perspectives 4: 131- 147.

Krattenmaker, T., and S. Salop. 1986. Anti-competitive exclusion: Raising rivals' costs to gain power over price. Yale Law Journal, December.

Kreps, D. 1990. A Course in Microeconomic Theory. Princeton University Press, Princeton.

Kreuger, A. 1987. The political economy of the rent-seeking society. In International Trade, J. Bhagwati (ed.). Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

Laffont, 1. –J. 1989. The Economics of Information and Uncertainty. MIT Press, Cambridge.

Lange, O. 1967. Essays on Economic Planning. 2nd ed. Asian Publishing House, Bombay.

Lazear, E. P., and S. Rosen. 1981. Rank-order tournaments as optimum labor contracts. Journal of Political Economy 89:841-864.

Leibenstein, H. 1966. Allocative efficiency and X-efficiency. American Economic Review 56: 392-415.

Lemer, A. P. 1944. The Economics of Control. Macnillan, New York.

Lewis, A. 1928. Overhead Costs. Holt & Rinehart, New York.

Lucas, R, E., Jr. 1972. Expectations and the neutrality of money. Journal of Economic Theory 4:103- 124.

March, J. G., and H. Simon, 1958, Organizntions. Wiley, New York.

Marris, R. K. 1964. The Economic Theory of Managerial Capitalism. Free Press, New York.

Marschak, J., and R. Radner. 1972. Economic Theory of Teams. Yale University Press, New Haven.

Mayer, C. 1989. Financial systems, corporate finance and economic development. CEPR. Mimeo.

Mayer, C. 1990. Financial systems, corporate finance, and economic development. In Asymmetrical Information, Corporate Finance, and Investment, R. G. Hubbard (ed.). University of Chicago Press, Chicago.

Maynard-Smith, J. 1976. Evolution and the theory of games. American Scientist 64:41-45.

Maynard-Smith, J. 1982. Evolution and the Theory of Games. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

McKelvey, W. 1982. Organizational Systematics: Taxonomy, Evolution, and Classification. University of California, Los Angeles.

McKinnon, R. 1991a. Financial control in the transition to a market economy from classical socialism. In The Emergence of Market Economies in Eastern Europe, C. Clague (ed.). Basil Blackwell, Oxford.

McKinnon, R. 1991b. The Order of Economic Liberalization: Financial Control in the Transition to Market Economy. Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore

McKinnon, R. 1992. Taxation, money, oil credit in a liberalizing socialist economy. Journal of Economic Perspectives 5:107-122.

Milgrom, P., and J. Roberts. 1988. An economic approach to influence activities and organizational responses. American Journal of Sociology 94 (July suppl.): S154-S179.

Milgrom, P., and J. Roberts. 1992. Economics, Organization, and Management. Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs, NJ.

Milgrom, P., and N. Stokey. 1982. Information, trade and common knowledge. Journal of Economic Theory 26:17-27.

Mirrlees, J. 1971. An exploration in the theory of optimum income taxation. Review of Economic Studies 38:175-208.

Mirrlees, J. 1975. The theory of moral hazard and unobservable behavior. Mimeo. Nuffield College, Oxford, 1975.

Morck, R., A. Shleifer, and R. W. Vishny. 1989. Alternative mechanisms for corporate control. American Economic Review 79:842-852.

Morck, R., A. Shleifer, and R. W. Vishny. 1990. Do managerial objectives drive bank acquisitions? Journal of Finance 45:31-48.

Mortensen, D. 1989. The persistence and indeterminacy of unemployment in search equilibrium. Scandinavian Journal of Economics 91:367-372.

Musgrave, R. 1959. The Theory of Public Finance. McGraw-Hill, New Yark.

Myers, S. 1977. Determinants of corporate borrowing. Journal of Financial Economics 4:147- 175.

Myers. S., and N. Majluf. 1984. Corporate financing and investment decisions when firms have information that investors do not have. Journal of Financial Economics 13:187-221.

Nalebuff, B., and J. E. Stiglitz. 1983a. Prizes and incentives: Towards a general theory of compensation and competition. Bell Journal of Economics 14:21 -43.

Nalebuff, B., and J. E. Stiglitz. 1983b. Information, competition and markets. American Economic Review 72:278-284.

Nelson, R. R., and S. G. Winter. 1974. Neoclassical vs. evolutionary theories of economic growth: Critique and prospectus. Economic Journal 84:886-905.

Nelson, R. R., and S. G. Winter. 1982. An Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change. Harvard University Press, Cambridge.

Newbery, D., and J. E. Stiglitz. 1981. The Theory of Commodity Price Stabilization. Oxford University Press, Oxford.

Newbery, D., and J. E. Stiglitz. 1982. The choice of techniques and the optimality of market equilibrium with rational expectations. Journal of Political Economy 90:223-246.

Newbery, D., and J. E. Stiglitz. 1983. Information, competition and markets. Economic Review 72:278-284.

Newbery, D., and J. E. Stiglitz. 1984. Pareto-inferior trade. Review of Economic Studies 51:1-13.

Newbery, D., and J. E. Stiglitz. 1987. Wage rigidity, implicit contracts, unemployment and economic efficiency. Economic Journal 97:416-430.

Pelikan, P. 1982. An Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change. Harvard University Press, Cambridge.

Pelikan, P. 1989. Evolution, economic competence, and the market for corporate control. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 12:279-303.

Persky, J. 1989. Adam Smith's invisible hands. Journal of Economic Perspectives 3:195- 201.

Persky, J. 1991. Lange and von Mises, large-scale enterprises, and the economic case for socialism: Retrospectives. Journal of Economic Perspectives 5:229-236.

Prescott, E. C., and R. M. Townsend. 1984. Pareto optima and competitive equilibria with adverse selection and moral hazard. Econometrica 52:21-45.

Radner, R. 1968. Competitive equilibrium under uncertainty. Econometrica 36:31-58.

Radner, R. 1972. Existence of equilibrium of plans, prices, and price expectations in a sequence of markets. Econometrica 40:289-303.

Radner, R. 1974. A note on unanimity of stockholders' preferences among alternative production plans: A reformulation of the Ekern- Wilson model. Bell Journal of Economics 5:181-184.

Radner, R. 1979. Rational expectations equilibrium: Generic existence and the information revealed by prices. Econometrica 47:655-678.

Radner, R., and J. E. Stiglitz. 1984. Nonconcavity in the value of infonnation. In Bayesian Models in Economic Theory, vol. 5, M. Boyer and R. Kilstrom (eds.). Elsevier, Amsterdam, pp. 33-52.

Ramsey, F. 1927. A contribution to the theory of taxation. Economic Journal 37:47-61.

Rey, P., and J. E. Stiglitz. 1992. Short-term contracts as monitoring devices. Stanford University mimeo.

Robinson, J.1933. The Economics of Imperfect Competition. Macrnillan, London.

Romer, C. P. 1986. Is the stabilization of the postwar economy a figment of the data? American Economic Review 76:314-334.

Ross, S. 1973. The economic theory of agency: The principal's problem. American Economic Review 63:134-139.

Rothschild, M., and ]. Eo Stiglitz. 1975. Existence and equilibrium in markets with imperfect infonnation. Paper presented to World Congress of the Econometric Society, Toronto.

Rothschild, M., and J. E. Stiglitz. 1976. Equilibrium in competitive insurance markets. Quartery Journal of Economics 90:629-649.

Rotter, C. 1988. World War I and the postwar depression: A reinterpretation based on alternative estimates of GNP. Journal of Monetary Economics 22:91-115.

Sah, R. 1991. Fallibility in human organizations and political systems. Journal of Economic Perspectives 5:67-88.

Sah, R., and J. E. Stiglitz. 1985a. Human fallibility and economic organization. American Economic Review 75:292-297.

Sah, R.. and J. E. Stiglitz. 1985b. Perpetuation and self-reproduction of organizations: The selection and performance of managers. Presented at World Congress of Econometric Society. Cambridge, August.

Sah. R., and J. E. Stiglitz. 1986. The architecture of economic systems: Hierarchies and polyarchies. American Economic Review 76:716-727.

Sah, R., and J. E. Stiglitz. 1987. The invariance of market innovation to the number of firms. Rand Journal of Economics 18:98-108.

Sah, R., and J. E. Stiglitz. 1988a. Committees, hierarchies and polyarchies. Economic Journal 98:451-470.

Sah, R., and J. E. Stiglitz. 1988b. Qualitative properties of profit-maximizing K-out-of-N systems subject to two kinds of failure. IEEE Transactions on Reliability 37:515-520.

Sah, R., and J. E. Stiglitz. 1991. Quality of managers in centralized versus decentralized economic systems. Quarterly Journal of Economics 106:289-296.

Salop, S. 1976. Information and monopolistic competition. American Economic Review 66: 240-245.

Salop, S. 1977. The noisy monopolist: Imperfect information, price dispersion and price discrimination. Review of Economic Studies 44:393-406.

Salop, S. C. 1979a. Strategic entry deterrence. American Economic Review 69:335-338.

Salop, S. C. 1979b. Monopolistic competition with outside goods. Bell Journal of Economics 10:141-156.

Salop, S., and D. Scheffman. 1983. Raising rivals' costs. American Economic Review 73:267- 271.

Salop, S., and J. E. Stiglitz. 1977. Bargains and ripoffs: A model of monopolistically competitive price dispersions. Review of Economic Studies 44:493-510.

Salop, S., and J. E. Stiglitz. 1982. The theory of sales: A simple model of equilibrium price dispersion with identical agents. American Economic Review 72:1121-1130.

Salop, S., and J. E. Stiglitz. 1987. Information, welfare and product diversity. In Arrow and the Foundations of the Theory of Economic Policy, G. Feiwel (ed.). Macnillan, London, pp. 328-340.

Samuelson, P. 1947. Foundations of Economic Analysis. Harvard. University Press, Cambridge.

Samuelson, P. 1965. A theory of induced innovation along Kennedy-Weizsaecker lines. Review of Economics and Statistics 47:160-173.

Samuelson, P. 1967. Indeterminacy of development in a heterogeneous capital model with constant saving propensity. In Essays on the Theory of Optima/ Economic Growth, K. Shell (ed.). MIT Press, Cambridge.

Sappington, D., and J. E. Stiglitz. 1987a. Information and regulation. In Public Regulation, E. Bailey (ed.). MIT Press, Cambridge, pp. 3-43.

Sappington, D., and J. E. Stiglitz. 1987b. Privatization, information and incentives. Journa/ of Policy Ana/ysis and Management 6:567-582.

Shavell, S. 1979. On moral hazard and insurance. Quarterly Journal of Economics 93:541-562.

Shleifer, A., and R. Vishny. 1986. Large shareholders and corporate control. Journal of Political Economy 94:461-488.

Shleifer, A., and R. Vishny. 1989. Management entrenchment: The cost of manager-specific investments. Journal of Financial Economics 25:123-139.

Schmalensee, R. 1982. Product differentiation advantages of pioneering brands. American Economic Review 72:349-365.

Schmalensee, R., and J. Willig. 1983. Handbook of Industrial Organization. North-Holland, Amsterdam.

Schumpeter, J. 1942. Socialism, Capitalism, and Democracy. Harper, New York.

Schumpeter, J. [1946] 1986. The Dynamics of Market Economies. McGraw-Hill, New York.

Scitovsky, T. 1950. Ignorance as a source of oligopoly power. American Economic Review 40:48-53.

Shapiro, C. 1983. Premiums for high quality products as returns to reputations. Quarterly Journal of Economics 98:659-679.

Shapiro, C., and. J. E. Stiglitz. 1984. Equilibrium unemployment as a worker discipline device. American Economic Review 74:433-444.

Shapiro, C., and J. E. Stiglitz. 1985a. Equilibrium unemployment as a worker discipline device: Reply. American Economic Review 75(4):892-893.

Shapiro, C., and J. E. Stiglitz. 1985b. Can unemployment be involuntary? American Economic Review 75(5):1215-1217.

Shell, K., M. Sidrauski, and J. E. Stiglitz. 1969. Capital gains, income, and savings. Review of Economic Studies 36: 15- 26.

Shell, K., and J. E. Stiglitz. 1967. Allocation of investment in a dynamic economy. Quarterly Journal of Economics 81:592-609.

Shoven, J., and L. Bagwell, 1989, Cash distributions to shareholders, Journal of Economic Perspectives 3:129- 140.

Simon, H. A. 1991. Organizations and markets. Journal of Economic Perspectives 5:25-44.

Solow, R. 1957. Technical change and the aggregate production function. Review of Economics and Statistics 39:312-320.

Solow, R, M., and P. A. Sarnuelson. 1953. Balanced growth under constant returns to scale. Econometrica 21:412-424.

Solow, R. M., and P. A. Samuelson. 1956. A compete capital model involving heterogeneous capital goods. Quarterly Journal of Economics 70:537-562.

Spence, A. M. 1976. Production selection, fixed costs, and monopolistic competition. Review of Economic Studies 43:217-235.

Spence, A. M. 1977. Entry, capacity, investment and oligopolistic pricing. Bell Journal of Economics 8:534-544.

Starrett, D. 1972. Fundamental nonconvexities in the theory of externalities. Journal of Economic Theory 4:180-199.

Starrett, D. 1988. Foundations of Public Economics. Cambridge University Press. Cambridge.

Stigler, G. 1971. Theory of regulation. Bell Journal of Economics 2:3-21.

Stiglitz, J. E. 1969. Theory of innovation: Discussion. AEA Papers and Proceedings 59:46-49.

Stiglitz, J. E. 1971. Perfect and imperfect capital markets. Presented at the Meetings of the Econometric Society, New Orleans.

Stiglitz, J. E. 1972a. Some aspects of the pure theory of corporate finance: Bankruptcies and take-overs. Bell Journal of Economics 3:458-482.

Stiglitz, J. E. 1972b. On the optimality of the stock market allocation of investment. Quarterly Journal of Economics 86:25-60. (Shortened version of a paper presented at the Far Eastern Meetings of the Econometric Society, June 1970. Tokyo.)

Stiglitz, J. E. 1973a. Recurrence of techniques in a dynamic economy. In Models of Economic Growth, J. Mirrlees (ed.). Macmillan, London, pp. 138-161.

Stiglitz, J. E. 1973b. Taxation, corporate financial policy and the cost of capital. Journal of Public Economics 2:1-34.

Stiglitz, J. E. 1974. Incentives and risk sharing in sharecropping. Review of Economic Studies 41:219-255.

Stiglitz, J. E. 1975a. Information and economic analysis. In Current Economic Problems, Parkin and Nobay (eds.). Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp. 27-52.

Stiglitz, J. E. 1975b. Incentives, risk and information: Notes towards a theory of hierarchy. Bell journal of Economics 6:552 -579.

Stiglitz, J. E. 1975c. The theory of screening, education and the distribution of income. American Economic Review 65:283-300.

Stiglitz, J. E. 1977a. Theory of local public goods. In The Economics of Public Services, M. S. Feldstein and R. P. Inman (eds.). Macmillan, London, pp. 274-333.

Stiglitz, J. E. 1977b. Monopoly, nonlinear pricing and imperfect information: The insurance market. Review of Economic Studies 44:407-430.

Stiglitz, J. E. 1979. On search and equilibrium price distributions. In Economics and Human Welfare: Essays in Honor of Tibor Scitovsky, M. Boskin (ed.). Academic Press, San Diego, pp. 203-216.

Stiglitz, J. E. 1981a. Potential competition may reduce welfare. American Economic Review 71:184-189.

Stiglitz, J. E. 1981b. Ownership, control and efficient markets: Some paradoxes in the theory of capital markets. In Economic Regulation: Essays in Honor of James R. Nelson. K. D. Boyer and W. G. Shepherd (eds.). University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor. pp. 311-341.

Stiglitz, J. E. 1982a. The inefficiency of the stock market equilibrium. Review of Economic Studies 49:241-261.

Stiglitz, J. E. 1982b. Self-selection and Pareto efficient taxation. Journal of Public Economics 17:213-240.

Stiglitz, J. E. 1982c. Utilitarianism and horizontal equity: The case for random taxation. Journal of Public Economics 18:1-33.

Stiglitz, J. E. 1982d. Ownership, control and efficient markets: Some paradoxes in the theory of capital markets. In Economic Regulation: Essays in Honor of James R. Nelson, K. D. Boyer and W. G. Shepherd (eds.), University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, pp. 1121-1130.

Stiglitz, J. E. 1982e. Information and capital markets. In Financial Economics: Essays in Honor of Paul Cootner, William F. Sharpe and Cathryn Cootner (eds.). Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs, NJ, pp. 118-158.

Stiglitz, J. E. 1983a. Public goods in open economies with heterogeneous individuals. In Locational Analysis of Public Facilities, J. F. Thisse and H. G. Zoller (eds.). North-Holland, Amsterdam, pp. 55-78.

Stiglitz, J. E. 1983b. The theory of local public goods twenty-five years after Tiebout: A perspective. In Local Provision of Public Services: The Tiebout Model after Twenfy-five Years, G. R. Zodrow (ed.). Academic Press, San Diego, pp. 17-53.

Stiglitz, J. E. 1985a. Economics of infonnation and the theory of economic development. Revista de Econometrica 5:5-32.

Stiglitz, J. E. 1985b. Credit markets and the control of capital. Journal of Credit and Banking 17:133-152.

Stiglitz, J. E. 1985c. Information and economic analysis: A perspective. Economic Journal Suppl., 95:21-41.

Stiglitz, J. E. 1986a. Towards a more general theory of monopolistic competition. In Prices, Competition and Equilibrium, M. Peston and R. Quandt (eds.). Allan, Oxford, pp. 22-69.

Stiglitz, J. E. 1986b. Theory of competition, incentives and risk. In New Developments in the Theory of Market Structure, J. E. Stiglitz and F. Mathewson (eds.). MIT Press. Cambridge, pp. 399-449.

Stiglitz, J. E. 1987a. Pareto efficient and optimal taxation and the new new welfare economics. In Handbook on Public Economics. A. Auerbach and M. Feldstein (eds.). Elsevier Science Publishers/North-Holland, Amsterdam. pp. 991-1042.

Stiglitz, J. E. 1987b. The causes and consequences of the dependence of quality on price. Journa] of Economic Literature 25:1-48.

Stiglitz, J. E. 1987c. Competition and the number of firms in a market: Are duopolies more competitive than atomistic markets? Journal of Political Economy 95:1041- 1061.

Stiglitz, J. E. 1987d. On the microeconomics of technical progress. In Technology Generation in Latin American Manufacturing Industries, Jorge M. Katz (ed.). Macmillan, London, pp. 56-77.

Stiglitz, J. E. 1987e. Design of labor contracts: Economics of incentives and risk sharing. Incentives, Cooperation and Risk Sharing, M. Nalbathian (ed.). Rowman and Allanheld, Totawa, NJ.

Stiglitz, J. E. 1987f. Theory of competition, incentives and risk. In New Developments in The Theory of Market Structure, J. E. Stiglitz and F. Mathewson (eds.). Macmillan, New York.

Stiglitz, J. E. 1987g. Technological change, sunk costs, and competition. Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 3.

Stiglitz. J. E. 1987h. Sharecropping. In The New Palgrave: A Dictionary of Economics. Macmillan, London.

Stiglitz. J. E. 1988a. Economic organization, information. and development. In Handbook of Development Economics. H. Chenery and T. N. Srinivasan (eds.). Elsevier Science Publishers, Amsterdam, pp. 94-160.

Stiglitz, J. E. 1988b. Economics of the Public Sector. 2d ed. Norton. New York. [Kinh tế học công cộng, Nxb. Khoa học kĩ thuật, Hà Nội, 1995]

Stiglitz, J. E. 1988c. Why financial structure matters. Journal of Economic Perspectives 2: 121-126.

Stiglitz, J. E. 1988d. Money, credit and business fluctuations. Economic Record (December): 307-322

Stiglitz, J. E. 1989a. Principal and agent. In The New Palgrave: Allocation, Information and Markets, J. Eatwell, M. Milgate, and P. Newman (eds.). Macnillan, London, pp. 241-253.

Stiglitz, J. E. I989b. Imperfect information in the product market. In Handbook of Industrial Organization, vol. 1. Elsevier Science Publishers, Amsterdam. pp. 769-847.

Stiglitz, J. E. 1989c. Using tax policy to curb speculative short-term trading. Journal of Financial Services Research 3:101-115.

Stiglitz, J. E. 1989d. Incentives, information and organizational design. Empirica 16:3-29.

Stiglitz, J. E. 1989e. Some aspects of a general theory of economic organization. Lecture presented at the Ninth Latin American Meeting of the Econometric Society, Santiago, Chile, August.

Stiglitz, J. E. 1989f. On the economic role of the state. In The Economic Role of the State, A. Heertje (ed.). Basil Blackwell. Oxford, pp. 9-85.

Stiglitz, J. E. 1990a. Remarks on the occasion of the presentation of the UAP Prize. In Journees Scientifiques & Prix UAP, 1988, 1989, 1990, vol. 2. Conseil Scientifique de l'UAP, December, pp. 23-32.

Stiglitz, J. E. 1990b. Some retrospective views on growth theory presented on the occasion of the celebration of Robert Solow's 65th birthday. In Growth/Productivity/Unemployment: Essays to Celebrate Bob Solow's Birthday, Peter Diamond (ed.). MIT Press, Cambridge, pp. 50-68.

Stiglitz, J. E. 1990c. Peer monitoring and credit markets. World Bank Editorial Review 4:351-366.

Stiglitz, J. E. 1991a. Symposium on organizations and economics. Journal of Economic Perspectives 5:15-24.

Stiglitz, J. E. 1991b. Some theoretical aspects of the privatization: Applications to Eastern Europe. Rivista di Politica Economica (December): 179-204.

Stiglitz, J. E. 1991c. The economic role of the state: Efficiency and effectiveness. Efficiency and Effectiveness, T. P. Hardiman and M. Mulreany (eds.). Institute of Public Administration, Dublin, pp. 37-59.

Stiglitz, J. E. 1992a. Contract theory and macroeconomic fluctuations. Nobel Symposium (No. 77) on Contract Economics, L. Werin and H. Wijkander (eds.). Basil Blackwell. Oxford.

Stiglitz. J. E. 1992b. Capital markets and economic fluctuations in capitalist economies. European Economic Review 36:269-306.

Stiglitz, J. E. 1992c. Notes on evolutionary economics: Imperfect capital markets, organizational design, and long-run efficiency. Paper presented at Osaka University International Symposium on "Economic Analysis of Japanese Firms and Markets: A New Microeconomic Paradigm." Osaka, Japan, November 9.

Stiglitz, J. E. 1992d. The meanings of competition in economic analysis. Rivista internazionale di Scienze sociali 2 (April): 191 -212.

Stiglitz, J. E. 1992e. The design of financial systems for the newly emerging democracies of Eastern Europe. In The Emergence of Market Economies in Eastern Europe, C. Clague and G. C. Rausser (eds.). Basil Blackwell, Oxford, pp. 161 -184.

Stiglitz, J. E. 1993a. Incentives, Organizational structures, and contractual choice in the reform of socialist agriculture. Presented at World Bank conference, "Agricultural Reform in Eastern Europe and the USSR." Budapest, August 1990, forthcoming in Proceedings.

Stiglitz, J. E. 1993b. Welfare Economics with Imperfect and Asymmetric Infonnation. Lindahl Lectures presented at Uppsala. Oxford University Press, Oxford.

Stiglitz, J. E. 1993c. Infonnation and Economic Analysis. Oxford University Press, Oxford.

Stiglitz, J. E. 1994. The role of the state in financial markets. Proceedings of the World Bank Annual Conference on Development Economics, 1993, pp. 19-52.

Stiglitz, J. E., and P. Dasgupta. 1971. Differential taxation, public goods, and economic efficiency. Review of Economic Studies 38:151-174.

Stiglitz, J. E., and A, Weiss, 1981. Credit rationing in markets with imperfect information, American Economic Review 71:393-410.

Stiglitz, J. E., and A. Weiss. 1983. Incentive effects of termination: Applications to the credit and labor markets. American Economic Review 73:912-927.

Stiglitz, J. E., and A. Weiss. 1990. Banks as social accountants and screening devices and the general theory of credit rationing. Greek Economic Review suppl., 12:85-118.

Summers, L., and V. Summers. 1989. When financial markets work too well: A cautious case for the securities transaction tax. Journal of Financial Services 3:261- 286.

Taylor, F. 1948. The guidance of production in a socialist state. In On the Economic Theory of Socialism, O. Lange and F. Taylor (eds.). University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis.

Tirole, J. 1982. On the possibility of speculation under rational expectations. Econometrica 50:1163-1181.

Wade, R. 1990. Governing the Market: Economic Theory and the Role of Government in East Asian Industrialization. Princeton University Press, Princeton.

Weitzman, M. 1974. Prices vs. Quantities. Review of Economic Studies 41:477-491.

Weitzman, M. L. 1980. The "ratchet principle" and performance incentives. Bell Journal of Economics 11:302-308.

Willig, R. 1992. Anti-monopoly policies and institutions. In The Emergence of Market Economies in Eastern Europe, C. Clague and G. Rausser (eds.). Basil Blackwell, Oxford, pp.187-196.

Wilson, C. A. 1977. A model of insurance market with incomplete information. Journal of Economic Theory 16:167-207.

Wilson, R. 1977. A bidding model of "perfect" competition. Review of Economic Studies 44:511-518.

Wolinsky, A. 1986. True monopolistic competition as a result of imperfect information. Quarterly Journal of Economics 101:493-512.

Winter, S. G. 1971. Satisficing, selection, and the innovating remnant. Quarterly Journal of Economics 85:237-261.

Winter, S. G. 1975. Optimization and evolution in the theory of the firm. In Adaptive Economic Models, R. H. Day and T. Graves (eds.). Academic Press, San Diego.

Young, A. 1928. Increasing returns and economic progress. Economic Journal 38:527-546.

© 2005 talawas